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Abstract
We discuss voting scenarios in which the set of voters (agents) and the set of alternatives
are the same; that is, voters select a single representative from among themselves. Such
a scenario happens, for instance, when a committee selects a chairperson, or when peer
researchers select a prize winner. Our model assumes that each voter either renders worthy
(confirms) or unworthy any other agent. We further assume that the prime goal of each
agent is to be selected himself. Only if that is not feasible, will he try to get one of those
that he confirms selected. In this paper, we investigate the open-sequential voting system in
the above model. We consider both plurality (where each voter has one vote) and approval
(where a voter may vote for any subset). Our results show that it is possible to find scenarios
in which the selected agent is much less popular than the optimal (most popular) agent. We
prove, however, that in the case of approval voting, the ratio between their popularity is
always bounded from above by 2. In the case of plurality voting, we show that there are
cases in which some of the equilibria give an unbounded ratio, but there always exists at
least one equilibrium with ratio 2 at most.
1 Introduction
Consider a committee voting to select a chairperson. Each committee member would like the
honour of serving as chairperson himself. As a second best option he prefers one of several other
members to win the position.1 The committee members’ preferences profile can be represented
by a confirmation network, in which a direct edge indicates that the source of the edge confirms
the target. In the confirmation network of Figure 1 member #5 is the most popular member —
he is supported by three other members, while everyone else is supported by at most one.
As is the case in many committees, we assume the members are well-known to each other,
and hence the confirmation network is known to everyone. The ballot is open and conducted
sequentially. Since the committee members are always sited in the same places around the table,
∗This project has received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s
Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (grant agreement n 740435).
1An equivalent situation arises when the committee is about to select a course of action (e.g., tenure a re-
searcher) and each committee member is strongly associated with one of the alternatives.
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Figure 1: Five committee members and their confirmations.
the voting order is prefixed and known. We consider two voting methods: plurality, in which
each voter selects only one other member, and approval, in which members vote for any subset
of the other members. In either voting method, a member is not allowed to vote for himself,
but he is allowed to abstain. The member with the most votes is elected. Ties are broken by a
predetermined and publicly known preference order.
Game-theoretically, we have a multi-stage game, describable as an extensive-form game —
a tree with all possible voting-sequences, and an outcome at every leaf. The standard solution
for this kind of game is a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE). To find an SPE, we start with
the last voter. For every voting history, we assume this voter will choose a ballot which gives
him a best outcome (notice that there may be more than one ‘best outcome’). Moving to the
next-to-last voter, we know, for every voting history, how the last voter will respond to any of
his ballots. Thus, we can find all his best votes and fix one of them for any sequence of voting
history. We can continue this backward process until we select a best vote for all voters. Since
voters are indifferent between their best votes, in general there can be many SPEs.
We exemplify the model and its complexity in two scenarios. Example 1.1 shows a case in
which the most popular member is not elected in the unique SPE of plurality voting. The same
scenario with approval voting leads to two different SPEs — in one of them the most popular
member is the winner. In the network of Example 1.2 each member confirms at most one other
member. Later (Proposition 2.2) we will see that under this condition the outcome is always
‘almost-optimal’. Nevertheless, Example 1.2 shows that in the case of approval the outcome is
not trivial: one of the members manages to get a better result by voting for someone he does
not confirm.
Example 1.1. Assume that in the network of Figure 1 the voting order is lexicographic, and
so is the tie-breaking order.2 We will show that in this case, we have a unique SPE for plurality
voting, and a different unique SPE for approval voting. If the voting method is plurality, we
claim that member #1’s best vote is to abstain. This will place member #2 in a dilemma:
voting for #5 will allow #3 to abstain and get elected (after he gets the vote of #4) by the
tie-breaking rule. Member #2 will then opt to vote for #1, resulting ultimately in the election
of #1, even though #5, is the most popular member having the most confirmations. Now, if
approval is the voting method and #1 abstains, member #2 may vote just for #1 and get him
elected as before. He may also vote for both #1 and #5, in which case member #3 still has no
chance of being elected and will vote for #5, and #5, the most popular member, will win and be
2I.e., in case of a draw, the voter with lowest index wins.
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elected. We see that both ballots of #2 lead to an outcome which he confirms, hence both are
‘best-votes’. Later, when we formalize the model (Section 1.3), we add a ‘truth-bias’ assumption
which states that each member prefers the vote which is closest to his true confirmation set.
Under this assumption member #2 favours the vote {#1, #5} over just {#1}. In this case, #1
does not gain from abstaining; thus, using the ‘truth-bias’ assumption once more, we get that
#1’s best vote is to be truthful (i.e. vote for #5). Everyone else will be truthful as well, and
#5 will be elected.
Example 1.2. Figure 2 shows a network with four voters and at most one confirmation (out-
going edge) for each voter. The voting order and the tie-breaking order are both lexicographic.
In plurality voting, both #1 and #2 are truthful, and #3 is elected after abstaining. However,
in approval, #1 can achieve a better result by voting for both #4 and #2. Since #2 precedes
#3 in the tie-breaking order, #3 cannot be elected and will now vote for #4. Thus, in approval
voting, #4 is elected.
Figure 2: Four committee members and their confirmations.
1.1 Related work
Voting systems and their limitations have been long studied as part of the broader field of social
choice (see for example the classic book of Farquharson [10] and the more recent handbook,
[6]). The classical voting model assumes that the sets of voters and alternatives are disjoint,
and that each voter has a totally ordered preference over the alternatives. Sequential voting
with this model has been studied before and showed to contain counter-intuitive ‘paradoxes’.
Desmedt and Elkind [8] considered both simultaneous and sequential plurality voting. They
showed that a sequential voting system with at least three alternatives is prone to strategic
voting, which might lead to an unexpected outcome, such as a Condorcet winner who does not
win the election. Conitzer and Xia [7] further exemplified this phenomenon in a wide range of
sequential voting systems, characterized by their domination index. In [3] the authors showed
even more extreme examples of strategic ballots in sequential voting systems.
A confirmation network as an underlying model for simultaneous voting has also been studied.
Holzman and Moulin [12] took an axiomatic approach to show the possibilities and limitations
of such electoral systems. The main requirement of such systems, in their paper, is that no voter
will be able to manipulate the system to select him by delivering a dishonest, strategic ballot.
Alon et al. [1] investigated the same model, and showed the impossibility of incentive-compatible
(that is, ‘non-manipulable’), deterministic voting systems. They suggested a probabilistic system
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with a bounded ratio between the maximal in-degree and the expected in-degree of the elected
agent. Further works with the same theme can be found in [4, 11, 2].
1.2 Our contribution
In this paper, we discuss for the first time sequential voting with the underlying model of a
confirmation network, for both plurality and approval voting. We show the limitations of these
voting systems by demonstrating extreme cases in which an unpopular member is elected in an
SPE. On the other hand, we prove upper bounds on the ratio between the maximal in-degree
in the network and the in-degree of an SPE outcome.
1.3 The model
Let A be a set of agents. General social choice settings assume that each agent has ordinal
preferences over all possible outcomes (i.e., an elected agent in our case). In such general
settings it is arguable how to measure the quality of the elected agent. In this paper we restrict
attention to a simplified setting where the ordinal preference of each agent has only three levels:
each agent prefers himself, those he confirms are second, and those he does not confirm are last.
We model the preferences of the agents using a directed graph G(A,E) where the interpretation
of (x, y) ∈ E is that agent x confirms agent y. In this setting we have a natural measure of the
quality of the elected agent: the number of incoming edges. As we saw in Examples 1.1 and 1.2,
and will see in the results, even in this simplified setting the strategic analysis is quite involved.
The agents cast their votes sequentially and openly. We consider two voting rules: plurality,
where each agent is allowed to vote for at most one other agent, and approval, in which each
agent may vote for any subset of the other agents (abstentions are allowed). The winner of the
ballot is the one who receives the most votes, under a predetermined tie-breaking order. We
assume A is ordered; this order is used both as the voting order and the tie-breaking order.3
The utility of agent x from the outcome y is
Ux(y) =

1, y = x
1/2, (x, y) ∈ E
0, otherwise.
There is nothing particular about this function; any three-level function will do. Actually, U
will not be explicitly used in the remainder of the paper.
We are interested in voting strategies that form a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE). At
least one SPE is guaranteed to exist [16]; however, if in some subgame more than one ‘best vote’
option is available to an agent, multiple SPEs exist, possibly with different outcomes. Such
a situation can occur, for instance, when an agent does not confirm anyone and is also not
confirmed by any other agent (i.e., the agent is an ‘isolated’ node). If many agents are isolated,
and so indifferent to the outcome, they may each make an arbitrary vote and anyone may be
elected. To avoid this problem, we take the same approach as in [9] (see also [13, 17, 15]).
Namely, when an agent faces several best-votes, he will select the one which best reflects his
3It is only for convenience that we assume that the voting order and tie-breaking order are the same. The
proofs of the upper bounds on the ratio (Theorems 3.1 and 3.2) do not use this assumption. The negative examples
can be altered to give the same outcome for different tie-breaking orders (this is not to say that the same example
works for all tie-breaking orders).
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true confirmations. In order to quantify the truth-bias assumption, we add the following bonus
utility. Let f(x) be the number of agents that x confirms and actually votes for, and let g(x) be
the number of agents he does not confirm and nevertheless votes for. Then his bonus utility is
Bx = 2f(x)− g(x),
where 0 <  < 1/2n.4 When the outcome is y, the actual utility of agent x is given by Ux(y)+Bx.
1.4 Definitions and notations
We will use the following notations from graph theory. For a ∈ A let d(a) = din(a) := #{b ∈
A : (b, a) ∈ E} be the popularity of a. We denote by ∆in(G) := max
a∈A
d(a) the maximum in-
degree in G. Similarly, ∆out(G) is the maximum out-degree. An agent m is most popular if
d(m) = ∆in(G).
An agent is achievable if there is an SPE in which he is elected. We denote by W ⊆ A the
set of all achievable agents. Our goal in this paper is to find bounds on the difference and ratio
between the highest/lowest popularity of achievable agents and the maximal popularity in the
graph. Formally, for an achievable agent w ∈ W , let G−Ew be the graph we get from G after
removing all the out-edges of w. Let
D(w) = ∆in(G−Ew)− d(w), R(w) =
∆in(G−Ew)
d(w)
be the additive gap and the multiplicative ratio, respectively, between the highest popularity
and the popularity of w. We have two justifications for defining these measures on G−Ew and
not directly on G. The first is philosophical: we do not want w’s own confirmations to influence
the way he is measured.5 The second is mathematical elegance. We pay a small price in the
definitions in order to get clearer theorems. It is obvious, though, that ∆in(G−Ew) ≥ ∆in(G)−1;
thus it makes little difference, especially for large values of ∆in.
With a slight abuse of notation, we define for any graph G with plurality/approval voting,
D(G) = min
w∈W
D(w);6 for either plurality/approval let D = sup
G
D(G).7 We shall promptly see
that D is unbounded for both plurality and approval voting. In order to give a better description
of the limitations of the two voting methods, and to differentiate between them, we would like
to chart the asymptotic bounds of the multiplicative ratio when D → ∞.8,9 To that end, we
define for a graph G,
R(G) = min
w∈W
R(w), R(G) = max
w∈W
R(w),
4The intuition behind this function is that a voter would rather not report some or all of his confirmations
than vote for someone he does not confirm. The upper bound on  is chosen so that the utility from the outcome
always dominates the bonus utility.
5This argument relates to the notion of ‘incentive compatibility’ which is central in [1] and [12].
6Our definition for D(G) uses the best winner (and not the worst). This strengthens our results for the additive
gap which are all negative.
7For ease of notation we did not add a subscript to distinguish between D of plurality and D of approval. The
results are the same for both anyway.
8Note that if we define R without this asymptotic then it will be predominated by small graphs with low
values of D.
9Alternatively, we can take the asymptotic with respect to ∆in →∞.
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the maximal/minimal multiplicative ratio between the most popular agent and the winners. For
any positive integer k, we denote by Gk the family of graphs with D(G) ≥ k, and define10,11
R = lim
k→∞
sup
G∈Gk
R(G), R = lim
k→∞
sup
G∈Gk
R(G).
1.5 Main results and paper organization
In Section 2, we show a sharp transition of the additive gap. In networks where each agent
confirms at most one other agent (i.e., the maximum out-degree is one) there is a unique outcome,
and D(G) is always zero (Proposition 2.2). However, already for networks where agents confirm
at most two other agents (i.e., ∆out = 2), D is unbounded (Proposition 2.4). In Section 3, we
prove bounds on R and R. For approval voting we show that 1.5 ≤ R ≤ R ≤ 2 (Theorem 3.1);
whereas, for plurality voting we show that R ≤ 2 and R = ∞ (Theorem 3.2). These results
indicate that in worst-case scenarios approval voting succeeds in selecting more popular agents
than plurality voting. In Section 4 we sketch a generalization of our results to k-approval voting.
We wrap up with a discussion and open problems in Section 5.
2 Bounds on the additive gap
We start our discussion with the special case of graphs with a maximum out-degree of one (i.e.
each agent confirms at most one other agent). In this case, we show that both plurality and
approval voting have a unique winner in any SPE, and the winner is a most-popular agent or
almost most-popular agent.12 In approval voting, a vote of an agent to the set of his confirmed
agents is called truthful. In plurality voting, a vote of an agent to one of his confirmed agents (or
abstention if he does not confirm anyone) is called truthful. Our proof is based on the following
observation, which is a consequence of our truth-bias assumption.
Observation 2.1. In every SPE with outcome w, any agent who does not confirm w is truthful
in the SPE path.13
The reason is that the election of w is one of the worst outcomes for any agent who does not
confirm w; hence, being truthful is the only best vote for such an agent.
Proposition 2.2. For the class of graphs with a maximum out-degree of one, both plurality and
approval voting have a unique achievable outcome,14 and for both plurality and approval D = 0.
Before we prove this proposition, let us exemplify it in the scenario of Example 1.2. Notice
that every node in the network of that example has either one out-edge or none, so the proposition
applies. Indeed, we showed there that both plurality and approval have a unique SPE. In
addition, in approval voting agent #4 is elected, and he is the most popular. In plurality, agent
#3 is elected; notice, that if we remove his out-edge to #4, then he becomes one of the most
popular agents.
10Again we do not have different notations for plurality and approval. It will be clear from the context to which
of the two we refer.
11R and R are analogue to the ‘price of stability’ and the ‘price of anarchy’, respectively (see [14] Section
17.1.3).
12Meaning, that if we ignore his own confirmations, the elected agent is most popular.
13In fact, this simple observation holds even for a wider solution concept of Nash equilibria.
14Though it might be different between the two, see Example 1.2.
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Proof. We start by showing that the outcome is unique using backward induction. Given a
subgame (i.e., a history of votes), if the agent which is about to vote has a vote which gets him
elected, then this will be the outcome. Moreover, if he cannot get elected but he can get the
one he confirms elected, then this would be the outcome (here we use the assumption that he
confirms at most one agent). If he cannot get elected and cannot get the one he confirms elected,
by Observation 2.1 his unique best action is to be truthful, and by induction, the outcome is
determined uniquely.
Now fix an SPE. Let w be the winner of this SPE and let m 6= w be one of the most popular
agents. We denote by
CW := {a ∈ A : (a,w) ∈ E}; CM := {a ∈ A : (a,m) ∈ E};
the set of agents which confirm w and those which confirm m, respectively. By our assumption
on the out-degree, CM ∩CW = ∅. Thus, by Observation 2.1 the agents in CM\{w} are truthful.
So m gets the votes of all those who confirm him, except perhaps the vote of w. Again by
Observation 2.1, no agent in A\CW votes for w, which means that w cannot get more votes
than his in-degree. Since w is elected, we reach the conclusion that
|CW | ≥ |CM | − 1(w,m)∈E ,
and that is exactly the same as D = 0.
The proof of Proposition 2.2 can be generalized to subgames in which the remaining voters
confirm at most one agent. Suppose we are in the middle of a voting process with graph G.
Let U ⊂ A be the voters who have not yet voted and let G′ be the graph we get from G after
removing the out-edges of vertices in A\U . Let s = (s1, . . . , sn) be the current scoring vector.15
We define the potential of a vertex a ∈ A in this subgame to be ρ(a) = din(a,G′) + s(a), where
din(a,G
′) is the in-degree of a in G′.16 Let P = max
a∈A
ρ(a).
Proposition 2.3. Using the definitions above, if ∆out(G
′) ≤ 1 then there is a unique SPE for
the remaining voting process; if w is the outcome of this SPE and m is any agent with ρ(m) = P,
then
P − ρ(w) ≤ 1(w,m)∈E(G′).
We omit the proof which is very similar to that of Proposition 2.2. Proposition 2.3 will be used
in the proof of Proposition 2.4.
In contrast to Proposition 2.2, we will now show that even for graphs with a maximum
out-degree of two, D is no longer bounded. In the proof, we will show a voting scenario in which
voters who confirm both a very popular agent and a much less popular one are forced to vote
only for the less popular.
Proposition 2.4. For the class of graphs with a maximum out-degree of two, D is unbounded,
for both plurality and approval voting.
Proof. We will build a series of graphs, {Gk}, such that ∀k ≥ 2, ∆out(Gk) = 2, and the unique
achievable outcome, for both plurality and approval voting, has popularity ∆in(Gk)−k. Figure 3
15That is, si is the number of votes agent i received from the voters in A\U .
16In other words, ρ(a) is the maximum number of votes a can hope to reach when the voting is done.
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Figure 3: The graph Gk. Agent c1 has popularity
1
2k(k+ 1) + k− 1 while the winner, ck+1, has
popularity 12k(k + 1)− 1.
depicts the graph Gk. The agents in B and D are classified by their types (the number of agents
in each type is denoted below its circle). The order of the agents starts with the agents in D
by lexicographic order of their type, then agents in C by reverse lexicographic order and finally
the agents in B (i.e., the order is d1, . . . , dk−1, ck+1, . . . , c1, b1, . . . , bk).17
Notice that by Observation 2.1, the winner in any SPE must be from C; otherwise, we will have
a winner which got no votes, while c1 gets at least the votes of the agents in b1. Suppose we are
in the subgame which starts right after the ballot of the last agent in D. Since all the remaining
voters have at most one out-edge, according to Proposition 2.3 the winner must be an agent
which will have the highest potential if he abstains. Since the tie-breaking order is the same as
the voting order, the winner will be the first agent which will have the highest potential if he
abstains.
Now, the agents in D confirm both ck+1 and one other agent. The point will be that the
only best vote for these agents is to vote only for ck+1. Before proving the general case, we
demonstrate this phenomenon in the simplest case, when k = 2 (Figure 4). Here, if the agents
of type d1 give c1 at least one vote (e.g., if one votes for c3 and the other for {c1, c3}), then c3
cannot be elected (since after abstaining his total votes will be at most two, and c1’s potential
is at least three). Therefore c3 is truthful and c2 abstains and wins (he will have two votes from
B and one from c3; agent c1 may also have three votes, but c2 precedes him in the tie-breaking
order). This result is unfavourable for the agents of d1. However, if the agents d1 vote only
for c3, then c3 can now abstain; having the same potential as c1 and c2, agent c3 wins by the
tie-breaking.
Turning to the general case, assume first that all the agents in di, 1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1 vote for ci,
17As explained in Footnote 3, we use the same order for voting and for tie-breaking.
8
Figure 4: The graph G2.
and perhaps also for ck+1 (in case of approval voting). Since after the ballots of the agents in
D, the agents c3, . . . , ck+1 all have a lower potential than c1, while c2 can abstain and have the
highest potential, c2 is the winner. This outcome is unfavourable for the voters of d1. We claim
that a better vote for them is to vote only for ck+1, since that leads to the election of ck+1.
18
Indeed, if now all the voters of di, 2 ≤ i ≤ k − 1 vote for ci, then now c1, c4, · · · , ck+1 cannot
be elected since c2 will have a higher potential than theirs. However, c3 can abstain and win
by tie-breaking. Thus, the agents of d2 are now dissatisfied. If they now all vote just for ck+1
the same reasoning continues and shows that now c4 will be the winner unless all the agents of
d3 vote just for ck+1. Eventually, if all the voters of D vote just for ck+1 and ck+1 abstains, he
will get elected. The agents of D are all satisfied with this outcome, which shows that this is
an equilibrium. Indeed, our reasoning shows that this is the only equilibrium for both plurality
and approval voting. The difference between the popularity of the winner, ck+1, and the most
popular, c1, is k, which implies the claim of the proposition.
3 Bounds on the multiplicative ratio
In Section 2 we showed that in general, as much as we can tell from the additive gap measure,
both plurality and approval voting systems perform poorly. Notice, however, that in the series
of graphs in the proof of Proposition 2.4, the maximum in-degree in the graph Gk is ∆in(Gk) =
Θ(k2). This means that the ratio between the maximum in-degree and the popularity of the
unique achievable outcome is 1 + Θ(k−1). This raises the question whether a constant fraction
of popularity can be guaranteed in sequential voting. We shall see in Theorems 3.1 and 3.2, that
the bounds of the multiplicative ratio are non-trivial and are quite different between plurality
and approval voting.
Theorem 3.1. In plurality voting, R ≤ 2 and R is unbounded.
Proof. We shall first prove that R is unbounded. We show a series of graphs and SPEs, such
that the ratio between the most popular agent and the winner goes to infinity. To this end,
18To be more precise: each voter in d1 considers the situation in his turn. If all the voters before him voted
only for ck+1 then he sees the opportunity to make ck+1 elected. Otherwise, he cannot get a good result and is
just truthful.
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consider the graph in Figure 5. Suppose the agents’ order is: d1, d2, d3, c3, c2, c1, b1. We claim
that the following profile of strategies is an SPE.19
• Agent d1: always vote for b1.
• Agent d2: always vote for c2.
• Agent d3: if d1 voted for c1, then vote for c2. Otherwise, vote for c3.
• The rest of the agents: be truthful (abstain).
Figure 5: There is an SPE in which c3 is elected.
To see that all the agents always act rationally, we start from the last voters and proceed
backwards to the first. Agents c1, c2, c3, b1 confirm no one, thus, abstaining is always a best vote
for them. Agent d3 always gets an agent which he confirms elected, so his votes are best possible
as well. Moving on to agent d2, he will get c2 elected when d1 votes for c1 and that is a best
outcome for him. On the other hand, if d1 votes for b1, then d2 knows that d3 is about to vote
for c3, so the result will be bad for him no matter how he votes. The best thing he can do is to
vote for someone he confirms (like c2). Lastly, agent d1 is indifferent between voting for b1 and
c1 because anyhow the elected will be someone he does not confirm (c3 in the former case and
c2 in the latter). Thus, assuming that he votes for b1 is legitimate.
This proves the existence of a graph and an SPE with a multiplicative ratio 3. Figure 6 shows
the general case. Here, there is an SPE in which d1, . . . , dk−1 vote for b1, . . . , bk−1, respectively;
dk then votes for ck, who is elected. If di decides to vote for any of c1, . . . , ci, then di+1, . . . , dk
all vote for ci+1, hence di gains nothing. This is an SPE with a ratio of k, which shows that R
is unbounded.
In order to prove that R ≤ 2, we need to show that there is always an SPE in which the
winner’s in-degree is at least half of ∆in. Let G be any graph, and let m be one of the most
popular agents. Assume that every agent who confirms m would vote for him whenever it is
one of his best votes. Fix an SPE with this assumption, and let w 6= m be the winner. Notice
first, that by Observation 2.1 w cannot get more than d(w) votes, since anyone who does not
confirm him would not vote for him. Let Cm,w be the set of agents who confirm both m and
w, and let Cm,w be the set of agents who confirm m and do not confirm w. By Observation 2.1
and our assumption on the SPE, all the agents in Cm,w\{w} vote for m, which means that
|Cm,w\{w}| ≤ d(w). In addition, |Cm,w| ≤ d(w). Hence, we get that m’s popularity in G−Ew is
at most d(m) = |Cm,w|+ |Cm,w\{w}| ≤ 2d(w), and the claim follows.
In the next theorem, we prove finite bounds for both R and R in approval voting.
19Note that we only want to show that it is an SPE; we do not claim uniqueness here.
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Figure 6: There is an SPE in which ck is elected.
Theorem 3.2. In approval voting,
3
2
≤ R ≤ R ≤ 2.
Proof. The proof of the upper bound on R is similar to the proof of the upper bound on
R in Theorem 3.1. This time we do not need to make any assumption on the SPE — by
Observation 2.1 any voter who confirms the most popular agent and does not confirm the
winner is voting for the most popular agent. The claim now follows in a similar way.
To show the lower bound, we construct a series of graphs {Hk}k≥2 where ∆in(Hk) = Θ(k) and
R(Hk) = 3/2. In the graph Hk the agent m is the most popular, and there are four sets of
additional agents:
• The k agents in C = {c1, . . . , ck} are the only agents, besides m, with a positive in-degree.
They all have precisely k in-edges less than m, and all confirm only m. We will show that c1 is
the winner in the unique SPE.
• The k − 1 agents in D = {d1, . . . , dk−1} are those who confirm m but are forced not to vote
for him. For any 1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1, agent di confirms m and all the agents {cj : j ≤ i}.
• The k − 1 agents in E = {e2, . . . , ek} provide the threat which prevents agents of D from
voting for m. Agent ei, 2 ≤ i ≤ k, confirms all the agents {cj : j ≤ i}.
• Finally, the set B contains agents of k different types which serve as ‘equalizers’ which ensure
that all nodes in C have a popularity of d(m)− k = ∆in(Gk)− k. For 2 ≤ i ≤ k there are 2i− 3
agents of type bi and they only confirm ci. In addition, there are k − 1 agents of type bm who
confirm m.
The general graph is represented in Figure 7. The agents in C,D and E are ordered alternately in
lexicographic order: c1, d1, e2, c2, d2, e3, . . . , ck−1, dk−1, ek, ck; the agents in B ∪ {m} are ordered
after them in arbitrary order.
We will prove by induction on k that the winner in the unique SPE is agent c1. Notice that the
popularity of m in G−Ec1 is 3(k − 1) while the popularity of c1 is 2(k − 1), which implies the
claimed ratio. Our induction base is k = 2 (Figure 8). Here is a sketch of the unique SPE in this
scenario. The voting starts with c1 who abstains. If d1 and e2 are both truthful, then c2 will be
truthful as well (since c1 beats him anyhow), and m will be elected. As e2 does not confirm this
result, he will vote only for c2, who can now abstain and get elected. Agent d1, foreseeing this
possibility, must vote only for c1. Everyone after d1 will now be truthful and c1, c2 and m all
end up with two votes, leading to the election of c1 by tie-breaking. For a general k it is enough
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Figure 7: The graph Hk. Agent m has a popularity lead of k over all other agents, yet agent c1
is elected.
to show that the following holds after c1 abstains:
(1.) If d1, e2 are both truthful, then the winner is m.
(2.) If d1 is truthful and e2 votes for c2, then c2 is the winner.
(3.) If d1 votes for c1 and e2 is truthful, then c1 wins.
Notice that in any case, agents in B ∪D ∪ E are not achievable since they have no in-edges.
Proof of (1.) After truthful votes from d1 and e2, c1 and c2 have equal potentials. Moreover,
every agent who confirms c2, except for b2, also confirms c1. Since in the tie-breaking order
c1 and c2 are adjacent, it is not hard to see that due to the truthful bias assumption, in any
SPE, any agent except b2 must either include both c1, c2 or neither. This means that in any
SPE, c1 will precede c2 by tie-braking, hence c2 is not achievable. It is enough, therefore, to
show that if c2 and d2 are truthful, then m is the only achievable agent. Indeed, suppose that
there is an SPE in which the outcome is ci, 3 ≤ i ≤ k.20 By Observation 2.1, all the agents
in (C\{c1, c2, ci}) ∪ bm will be truthful, which means that m will end up with at least 2k − 1
votes,21 while the potential of ci is 2k − 2, which is a contradiction.
20Clearly, an agent from D ∪ E ∪B cannot get elected, since m already has three votes.
21Which are the votes of d1, d2 and C ∪ bm\{c1, ci}.
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Figure 8: The graph H2. Agent c1 gets elected after abstaining.
Proof of (2.) Notice that by an argument similar to that of (1), here c1 is not achievable
because c2 has higher potential. We claim that the subgame which starts with the vote of
c2 is equivalent to the voting (which starts with c1) in the graph Hk−1. More precisely, we
define a mapping ϕ : A(Hk)\(B ∪ {c1, d1, e1}) → A(Hk−1)\B, by ϕ(cj) = cj−1, ϕ(dj) = dj−1,
ϕ(ej) = ej−1, ϕ(m) = m. Since the agents of B vote last and support only one agent each,
they are non-strategic.22 We thus treat these agents as part of the potential of the agents in
C and ignore them in the description of an SPE. Now fix some SPE of the subgame which
starts with the voting of c2, and denote by V (a) ⊆ A(Hk) the ballot of agent a in this SPE. We
claim that the profile of voting in Hk−1 in which each agent ϕ(a) vote for ϕ(V (a)) is an SPE.
Indeed, the only difference between the two voting scenarios is that the potential of every agent
c ∈ C(Hk)\{c1} is higher by exactly two then the potential of ϕ(c) in Hk−1.23 Since the graph
structure, voting order and tie-braking are all the same, it is not possible that ϕ(V (a)) is not a
best vote of agent ϕ(a) in Hk−1. By the induction hypothesis, we know that the only SPE of
Hk−1 leads to the election of c1. Hence the only achievable agent in our subgame of Hk is c2, as
claimed.
Proof of (3.) Just like in (1), c2 is not achievable, hence c2 is truthful. Again we get a
subgame which is equivalent to Hk−1, only this time we ignore c2 and map ϕ(c1) = c1. The
rest of the claims are identical to the proof of (2). We get that the only achievable agent in this
subgame is c1.
22That is, their only best vote is to be truthful.
23Here the potential includes the “sure votes” of agents in B.
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4 Generalizing to k-approval
The two voting methods we discussed (namely, plurality and approval) can be generalized to a
k-approval voting method in which every voter is allowed to vote for at most k other agents.24
So plurality is no more than 1-approval, and approval is the same as (n − 1)-approval. The
two propositions of the additive gap (Propositions 2.2 and 2.4) had a single proof for both
plurality and approval, and it is not hard to see that it can be generalized for any k-approval.
Likewise, the bound R ≤ 2 can be proved for any k-approval in a similar way to the proof in
Theorem 3.1 (and see also the same argument in Theorem 3.2). We will now extend the second
part of Theorem 3.1 to any k-approval with k = o(n) by showing a series of graphs in which R
is unbounded.
Figure 9: There is an SPE in which c3 is elected.
In the graph in Figure 9 each agent di, i = 1, 2, 3 confirms the agents cj , 1 ≤ j ≤ i. In
addition, agent d1 confirms k additional agents, denoted b1, and d2, d3 each confirms k − 1
additional agents, denoted b2, b3, respectively. The agents’ order is d1, d2, d3, c3, c2, c1 and then
the rest. We describe an SPE in which c3 is elected. In this SPE, if d1 votes for any subset
which includes c1, then d2 and d3 will both vote for a subset which includes c2, and c2 is elected.
Since the outcome is one of the worst d1 can get, voting only for the k agents of b1 is a best
vote for him. In this case, d3 decides to vote for c3 and the k − 1 agents of b3, and c3 is elected
no matter how d2 votes. The multiplicative ratio in this SPE is 3. It is not hard to see how to
extend this example to get any ratio.
5 Discussion and open problems
Additive gap vs. multiplicative ratio
We have seen (Proposition 2.2) that in the special case where every agent confirms at most
one other agent, the elected agent will be most-popular or almost most-popular. However, as
soon as the maximum out-degree of the graph is higher than one, this is no longer the case. In
fact, we have shown (Proposition 2.4 and the discussion in Section 4) that D is unbounded even
when ∆in(G) = 2, for any k-approval voting. We, therefore, come to the conclusion that the
24We allow a voter to vote for less than k other agents and even abstain. Though this is not the standard
definition of k-approval, since we allowed abstentions in plurality and approval, this is the correct definition to
get the full range between plurality and approval.
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additive gap is not a sufficient measure for the quality of a voting method in this model. Thus
we turned to the multiplicative ratio for a finer evaluation.
Indeed the multiplicative ratio gave us different bounds for plurality and approval voting. In
the case of plurality, we have seen (Theorem 3.1) that even though there might be an SPE with
a ‘bad’ outcome (R is unbounded), for every graph, we are guaranteed to have an SPE with a
ratio of 2, at most. Moreover, our proof explains how to distinguish this SPE from other SPEs:
you just give a small extra incentive for those who confirm the most popular to actually vote for
him. The case of approval voting is clearer. Here (Theorem 3.2) we have proved finite bounds
for both R and R.
Plurality vs. approval
In [5], Brams demonstrated the superiority of approval voting over plurality voting in si-
multaneous voting systems. We conclude from our results, that in our setting, plurality voting
(and even k-approval voting for any k = o(n)) allows SPEs with unbounded multiplicative ratio,
while in approval, this ratio, in any SPE, will be between 1.5 and 2. We cannot draw from our
results a comparison of the ‘best outcome’. To achieve that, we need to bound R from below
for plurality voting.
Question 5.1. In plurality voting, is it possible to construct a series of graphs, {Gk}, with
∆in(Gk)→∞ and R(Gk) ≥ α for some α > 1 and all k?
Notice that in the series of graphs of Proposition 2.4, when D(Gk) = k, we have ∆in(Gk) =
Θ(k2). So in this particular example, R(Gk) = R(Gk) = 1 + O(1/k). If there is a non-trivial
(i.e. different than 1) bound for R in plurality voting, then there is a series of graphs, {Gk} such
that D(Gk) = k and ∆in(Gk) = Θ(k) (this is exactly what we have shown for approval voting,
when we proved the lower bound in Theorem 3.2). So a rephrase of the above question would
be:
Question 5.2. In plurality voting, is it possible to construct a series of graphs, {Gk}, with
∆in(Gk) = Θ(k) and such that D(Gk)→∞?
It is worthwhile to note here that the example giving the lower bound of Theorem 3.2 does
not work for plurality. To see that, consider the graph H2 (Figure 8). If c1 abstains, then even
if d1 votes for c1, e1 might opt to vote for c2, and as a result, c2 will be elected. So, for the case
of plurality voting, the graph H2 has an SPE in which m is elected, and the proof fails.
For the approval voting method, we have proved both a lower and upper bound on R,R.
Still, it could be nice to further narrow these bounds or even find the exact asymptotic values
of R,R.
Question 5.3. Can the bounds of Theorem 3.2 be narrowed down?
k-approval and a threshold between plurality and approval
Finally, we have seen that k-approval has the same bounds as plurality for any k = o(n).
When k = n− 1 this voting method is precisely approval; and so a natural question is what can
be said about the threshold function which separates k-approval from plurality.
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Question 5.4. Find a minimal function, f(n), such that the voting method f(n)-approval has
a finite bound for R.
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